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THE SURVEY OF ECONOMIC
EXPECTATIONS
ABSTRACT
We have recently initiated the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) in an effort to learn
how Americans perceive their near-term futures. This paper uses SEE data on over two thousand
labor force participants interviewed in 1994 and 1995 to describe how Americans in the labor force
perceive the risk of near-term economic misfortune. We measure economic insecurity through
responses to questions eliciting subjective probabilities of three events in the year ahead: absence
of health insurance, victimization by burglary, and job loss. With item response rates exceeding 98
percent, respondents clearly are willing to answer the expectations questions and they appear to do
so in a meaningful way. Using the responses to classify individuals as relatively secure, relatively
insecure, and highly insecure, we find that respondents with a high risk of one adverse outcome tend
also to perceive high risks of the other outcomes. Economic insecurity tends to decline with age and
with schooling. Black respondents perceive much greater insecurity than do whites, especially
among males. Within the period 1994-1995, we find some time-series variation in insecurity but no
clear trends. We find that expectations and realizations of health insurance coverage and of jobs tend
to match up quite closely, but respondents substantially overpredict the risk of burglary.
Jeff Dominitz Charles F. Manski
Institute for Social Research Department of Economics
University of Michigan Social Science Building




During the first few months of 1996, economic insecurity became a focus of
media attention in the United States. The New York Times (March 3-9) ran a week-
long series on “The Downsizing of America,” Business Week (March 11) devoted a
cover story to “Economic Anxiety,” and The Economist (April 6) offered its own
perspective on “Learning to Cope” with economic insecurity. This public
discourse coincided with policy proposals intended to reduce insecurity, such as
the Kassebaum-Kennedy bill (S 1028) to increase the portability of health
insurance and the “American Workers Economic Security Act” to reduce taxes on
corporations which “treat workers fairly” and to restrain corporate mergers and
acquisitions, among other provisions (Kennedy, 1996).
Attention to insecurity is by no means new. Advocating “some safeguards
against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this man-made world,”
Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a cabinet Committeeon Economic Security in 1934
(reprinted in Davis, 1986, p.449). This committee’s recommendations led to
passage of the Social Security Actof 1935, creating a system of social insurance
to partially insulate the population from the risk of economic hardship. Twenty
years later, the Federal Reserve Board’s Consultant Committee on Consumer Survey
Statistics recommended that data be collected to monitor “popular feeling of
anxiety and security” (reprinted in Tobin, 1959, p.10).
Since then, the federal government has invested substantially in the
development of statistics that monitor the current status of the population, but
not in statistics that monitor how Americans perceive their futures. Major
national surveys such as the Current Population Survey, the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics describe the
outcomes that individuals actually experience, but not the outcomes they expect2
to experience in the future.
A number of private survey organizations regularly elicit economic
expectations. These measures of “consumer confidence” have generally not
detected recent increases uneconomic insecurity. See, for example, the analysis
of Gallup survey data by Newport and Saad (1996).
Perhaps the available survey data show no increase in insecurity because
the apparent trend is simply an artifact of media hype in a presidential election
year. Or perhaps increased insecurity is not detected because the surveys are
not well-suited to monitor the phenomenon.
We have recently initiated the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) in an
effort to learn how Americans perceive their near-term futures. SEE is a
periodic module in WISCON, a national continuous telephone survey conducted by
the Letters and Science Survey Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
(see Winsborough, 1987). We measure respondents’ perceptions of near-term
economic insecurity through their responses to questions eliciting subjective
probabilities of three events:
Health Insurance: “What do you think is the percent chance (what are the chances
out of 100) that you will have health insurance coverage 12 months from now?”
Burglary: “What do you think is the percent chance (what are the chances out of
100) that someone will break into (or somehow illegally enter) your home and
steal something, during the next 12 months?”
Job LOSS: “What do you think is the percent chance that you will lose your job
during the next 12 months?”3
All respondents are asked the first two questions, and those currently working
are asked the third.
The use of probabilistic questions to elicit individuals’ expectations has
been recommended by Juster (1966), Savage (1971), Manski (1990), and Fischhoff
(1994), each of whom concludes that probabilistic questions should yield more
informative responses than do the qualitative expectations questions
traditionally asked in surveys. In Dominitz and Manski (1996a), we consider
three methods for learning about individuals’ expectations--el icitingqual itative
expectations, eliciting probabilistic expectations, and
from realizations--and make the case for probability e“
explains our thinking further.
inferring expectations
icitation. Section 2
Our empirical analysis begins in Section 3, which describes the SEE data.
We focus on respondents interviewed in 1994 and 1995 who are labor force
participants at the time of the interview. With item response rates exceeding
98 percent, respondents clearly are willing to answer the three subjective
probability questions. Moreover, they appear to do so in a meaningful way.
In Section 4 we use the responses to classify individuals as re7ative7y
secure, relatively insecure, and highly insecure. We find that respondents with
a high risk of one adverse outcome tend also to perceive high risks of the other
outcomes. We find that economic insecurity tends to decline with age and with
schooling. Black respondents perceive much greater insecurity than do whites,
especially among males.
With only two years of data, we cannot provide an historical perspective
on trends in economic insecurity but we can examine how expectations of economic
misfortune have varied recently. This is done in Section 5, where we find some
time-series variation in insecurity but no clear trends. With the accumulation4
of data from subsequent administrations of the SEE, we anticipate that the time-
series data will help us to understand how changes in the real economy affect
individuals’ expectations and, conversely, how expectations affect the real
economy.
Thedata we have already accumulated allowus to assess the extent to which
the expectations of various groups of Americans accurately predict their
subsequent realizations. In Section 6, we find that expectations and
realizations of health insurance coverage and of job loss tend to match up quite
closely, but respondents substantially overpredict the risk of burglary.
Section 7 gives conclusions.
2. Background
What is economic insecurity? An individual’s sense of economic insecurity
may be thought to arise from his or her perceptions of the risk of economic
misfortune. To monitor economic insecurity, analysts have used a variety of
measures derived from responses to survey questions eliciting individual
perceptions. In this section, we discuss these efforts. 1
1 Other analysts look instead to data on recent realizations. To ascertain
the perceived risk of job loss, for example, researchers may use the local
unemployment rate as a proxy. The inherently subjective nature of risk
perceptions, however, limits the usefulness of measures based only on
realizations data. See Manski (1993) and Dominitz and Manski (1996a).5
2.1. Standard Approaches to Measuring Insecurity
We decidedto elicit subjective probabilities of health insurance coverage,
burglary, and job loss after considering and rejecting standard survey measures
of subjective economic insecurity. We have three main areas of concern about
these measures, which we discuss here using as examples the questions posed by
some national survey organizations. The areas of concern are: qualitative
expectations, loosely-defined outcomes, and confounded phenomena.
Qualitative expectations:
Gallup Organization: Thinking about the next twelve months, how
likely is it that your [husband/wife] will lose [his/her] job or be
laid off-- is it very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not
at all likely? (CNN/USAToday/Gallup Poll, April, 1996, Wave 1; see
also Newport and Saad, 1996)
University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC): Now looking
ahead -- do you think that a year from now you (and your family
living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just
about the same as now? (Curtin, 1982)
When asked to consider the prospects for a given economic outcome, such as
the loss of one’s job, respondents are often asked to report whether
“think,” “expect,” or “are worried” that the event will occur. Sometimes




choice of modifiers, such as “very, ” “fair ly, ” “moderately, “ or “not at all”
likely/worried that the event will occur.
Perhaps the most basic problem concerns the interpersonal comparabilityof
responses. Do different respondents interpret these verbal phrases in the same
way? Empirical evidence indicates that interpretations of qualitative
expectations questions vary substantially between respondents (see Wallsten et
al., 1986) .
Even if respondents were to identically interpret these phrases, the
coarseness of response options would limit the information contained in the
responses. For example, a respondent to SRC’S Survey of Consumer Attitudes, who
must choose among “better,” “worse,” and “about the same,” cannot express much
about his or her prospects for financial well-being.
Loosely-defined outcomes:
New York Times: All in all, how economically secure do you feel?
Very insecure, somewhat insecure, ..? (New York Times, March3, 1996)
Our concern about interpersonal comparability comes into even sharper focus
when considering the outcomes about which respondents are asked. What does it
mean to be “economically secure,” as the New York Times asked earlier this year?
How does the respondent reduce the many facets of economic security into one
dimension? Do respondents interpret security as an absolute concept or as a
relative one? If relative, to whom or to what time period does the respondent
compare? Similar concerns apply to SRC’S forward-looking financial well-being
question (above) and to its backward-looking counterpart, which asks respondents7
to compare how well they “are getting along financially these days” to the
situation one year earlier. These types of questions are asked by SRC (Curtin,
1982), the Conference Board (Linden, 1982), and the Gallup Organization (Newport
and Saad, 1996), among others.
Confounded phenomena:
Harris: Compared to a year ago, do you feel more afraid and uneasy
on the streets today, less uneasy, or not much different than you
felt a few years ago? (Erskine, 1974)
Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) argue that “fearofc rime” questions generally
confound two concepts--the perceived risk of crime and the emotional response to
crime--which need not be strongly correlated. In fact, they argue that the
empirical evidence suggests these two phenomena are not strongly positively
related and, for some criminal activities, may be negatively related. Responses
to this type of survey question may therefore provide inefficient, if not
invalid, indicators of the perceived risk of crime victimization.
The confounding of two distinct phenomena in a single indicator also
characterizes measures of consumer confidence. For example, SRC’S Index of
Consumer Sentiment is derived from responses to a series of five questions,
including the two financial well-being questions previously discussed (see
Zagorski and McDonnell, 1995). Changes in this measure are said to reflect
changes in both optimism/pessimism and certainty/uncertainty (see Curtin, 1982,
and Throop, 1992). While inspection of the questions leaves us to wonder about
the mechanism by which subjective uncertainty is conveyed, it is clear that no8
single indicator can be well-suited to capture changes in two phenomena, unless
these phenomena are strongly positively related. We know of no empirical
evidence to substantiate such a claim.
2.2. New Approaches to Measuring Insecurity
We seek to elicit subjective probabilities of well-defined prospective
outcomes. These responses may be used to construct measures of economic
insecurity (see Section 4). A number of recent studies have elements in common
with our strategy to measure economic insecurity. We discuss some of them
briefly before proceeding to the analysis of our data.
The HRS/AHEAD Surveys: In 1992, SRC began two companion panel surveys of
51 to 61 year-old and of over-70 year-old Americans, entitled the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) surveys, respectively (see Juster and Suzman, 1995). In addition to many
questions on outcomes actually realized, respondents are asked a number of
questions eliciting the subjective probability of living to age 75/85, job loss,
entering a nursing home, and medical expenses using up all savings, among other
events. Thus far, analyses of these data have focused on expectations of one
outcome at a time, such as mortality (Hurd and McGarry, 1995) or nursing home
utilization (Holden et al., 1995).
The Italian SHIM and Dutch VSB-Pane7 Surveys: Two European surveys include
questions eliciting subjective probabilities of one-year-ahead growth rates in
income. Responses to the Bank of Italy’s 1989 Survey of Household Income and9
Wealth (SHIW) have been analyzed by Guiso et al. (1992), who focus on the effect
of income uncertainty on savings behavior. We are not aware of any analyses of
responses to similar questions contained in the more recent, continuing VSB-Panel
survey conducted by the Center for Economic Research in Tilburg, Netherlands.
The Carnegie Mellon Studies of Risk Perceptions: The Social and Decision
Sciences group at Carnegie Mellon University has undertaken a series of small-
scale studies (e.g., less than 300 subjects drawn from the Pittsburgh area)
eliciting subjective probabilities of various events. For example, Quadrel et
al. (1993) report findings from a diverse sample of adults and adolescents on
their perceived risks of becoming alcohol dependent, getting mugged, and becoming
sick from pesticide poisoning, among other adverse outcomes.
The Madison Study of Student Expectations: In Dominitzand Manski (1996b),
we describe the results of a survey in Madison, Wisconsin eliciting from71 high
school students and 39 college undergraduates their expectations of the income
they would earn if they were to complete different levels of schooling. The
questions elicited expectations in the form of subjective probabilities.
The Torino-Budapest Study of Socio-Economic Security: A group of
sociologists conducted a survey of 249 adults in Torino, Italy and 409 adults in
Budapest, Hungary in 1988 (Garner and Garner, 1991). Respondents were asked to
report the likelihood of job loss, crime victimization, moving because of
eviction or rent increase, and having a sufficient pension, among other outcomes.
Responses were given in the form of verbal quantifiers--very probable, probable,
improbable, very improbable. An index of economic security was constructed from10
these responses.
The 1993 Survey of Economic Expectations: The first version of SEE,
administered during 1993, elicited respondents’ one-year-ahead expectations of
income, earnings, and employment (see Dominitz, 1994, and Dominitz and Manski,
1996a). This study served as a proving ground for the series of questions
contained in the current, continuing survey. The income and employment questions
have been revised and supplemented, and the earnings questions have been replaced
by questions on health insurance coverage and crime victimization.
3. Elicitinq Sub.iective Expectations
3.1. The 1994-1995 Survey of Economic Expectations
We placed our set of probabilistic expectations questions as a periodic
module in WISCON, an ongoing national telephone survey conducted by the Letters
and Science Survey Center (LSSC) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The
WISCON survey core questions ask respondents about their labor market
experiences, demographics, and household income. Our module was included during
the periods April to July 1994 (henceforth, mid 1994), November 1994 to January
1995 (end 1994), May to July 1995 (mid 1995), and November 1995 to January 1996
(end 1995). The interviewing intensity varied across the time periods, but the
samples were drawn from the same population of American households with
telephones via the same random-digit dialing algorithm. LSSC completed 971
interviews in mid 1994, 480 in end 1994, 774 in mid 1995, and 661 in end 1995.11
The respondent selection rule chooses one adult person to interview from each
contacted household; hence adults living in single–adult households are drawn
with higher probability than adults living in multiple-adult households. In
Sections 4, 5, and 6, where we generalize our results to the U.S. labor force,
we present weighted estimates that adjust for differential respondent-selection
probabilities across households and time periods.
The module of expectations questions was prefaced by the following set of
instructions read to respondents:
Now I will ask you some questions about future, uncertain outcomes.
In each case, try to think about the whole range of possible
outcomes and think about how likely they are to occur during the
next 12 months. In some of the questions, I will ask you about the
PERCENT CHANCE of something happening. The percent chance must be
a number from O to 100. Numbers like:
2 or 5 percent may be “almost no chance”
20 percent or so may mean “not much chance”
a 45 or 55 percent chance may be a “pretty even chance”
80 percent or so may mean a “very good chance”
and a 95 or 98 percent chance may be “almost certain”
The percent chance can also be thought of as the number of CHANCES
OUT OF 100.
Our analysis focuses on the 2060 respondents who were in the labor force
at the time of the interview and who gave valid responses to the three questions
on economic insecurity. Respondents are defined to be in the labor force if they12
state that, at the time of the interview, they are either working for pay,
temporarily absent from a job, or looking for work. We exclude persons not in
the labor force because job loss probabilities are not meaningful for them.
Among the respondents who are in the labor force, we elicited job-loss
expectations only from those who are currently working. This group constitutes
about ninety percent of the labor force participants and it was necessary to
impute job-loss expectations to the remaining ten percent.2
3.2. Response Rates
The WISCON interviewers attempt to contact about twenty households per day
and obtain an interview from slightly over fifty percent of the selected
households. The nonresponse is fairly evenly divided between refusals to be
interviewed and cases in which repeated phone calls find the appropriate
respondent to be not at home or otherwise unable to complete the interview.
Our expectations questions were administered to 2886 WISCON respondents,
55 percent of whom were women, indicating that nonresponse rates differ somewhat
by gender. The sample includes 2102 labor force participants, 1063men and 1039
women. The respective male and female labor force partici pat
.65 exceed those typically found in recent Current Population
or six percentage points, for both men and women.
on rates of .82 and
Survey data by five
Table 1 reports the demographic and schooling characteristics of the
2 We assign 1.00 as the subjective probability of job loss to the 88
respondents who were unemployed at the time of the interview; that is, to those
who did not have a job and were looking for work. We assign 0.05 as the
subjective probability of job loss to the 135 respondents who stated that they
were “temporarily absent” from a job at the time of the interview. The value
0.05 is the population-wide median job-loss probability of employed persons.13
respondents. The first column describes the entire sample of 2886 individuals,
and the second column describes our sample of 2060 labor force participants who
gave valid responses to each of the economic insecurity questions. Weighted
fractions, which adjust for differential selection probabilities across
households and time, are given for each school ingand demographic group in column
four. The weighted fractions are very close to their unweighed counterparts in
column three.
Overall, 98 percent of labor force participants (2060 out of 2102)
responded to the economic insecurity questions. Rates of response vary
negligibly across the groups described in Table 1. The item response rate is
less than 95 percent in only one group, women aged 65 or more, among whom 39 out
of 44 responded.
3.3. Are the Responses Meaningful?
The feasibility and utility of eliciting subjective probabilities in
household surveys is a subject of some controversy among researchers. While
probabilistic questions should yield more informative responses than do the
qualitative expectations questions traditionally asked in surveys, a diverse
literature suggests that respondents may think about uncertain events using less
than the full structure of modern probability theory. See Camerer and Webber
(1992) .
If respondents have difficulty thinking in terms of subjective
probabilities, then perhaps they will be unwilling to respond to probabilistic
expectations questions. Our very high rates of item response indicate otherwise,
as do the high response rates generally obtained in the other studies described14
in Section 2.2.
Willingness to respond, however, does not imply that the responses are
meaningful. Perhaps responses are simply given in a perfunctory manner. There
is no definitive way to assess the seriousness with which respondents answer our
questions, but we can look for response patterns that may indicate a lack of
care. In particular, we can examine the extent of bunching at round numbers.
For each of the three events-- no health insurance coverage, burglary, and
job loss--Table 2 reports the complete frequency distribution of responses given
by the 2060 respondents.3 The entries in Table 2 indicate that each event tends
to be perceived as unlikely to occur, with the overwhelming majori ty of responses
falling in the lower half of the percent-chance scale. Responses appear to be
rounded to the nearest multiple of 5, except at such low values as 1 or 2
percent.
A fear commonly expressed by researchers skeptical of probability
elicitation is that respondents will concentrate their responses on the values
O, 50, and 100. Table 2 documents many reports of a O percent chance (almost
one-third of all responses), but many of these responses presumably are cases
where a respondent perceives less than a 1 percent chance of the event and simply
rounds down. Even if the responses are rounded down from somewhat higher values,
this type of rounding error should not greatly affect the results presented
below. Quadrel et al. (1993) are fundamentally interested in separating zero
from non-zero probabilities and adopt methods designed to induce more precise
responses.
3 Responses to the health insurance question have been subtracted from 100,
yielding the percent chance of not being covered rather than of being covered.
We make this transformation to focus on the likelihood of adverse outcomes in
each of the three cases.15
Wedo find more bunching at the value 50 than at other nearby multiples of
lnves~lgatea Lne ex~en~ oT Tnls Duncnlng conal~lonal on various
on attributes of respondents. We find that respondents who report
question are more likely to report the same value for another
this association is not strong. For example, eleven percent of all
5. We have “ .—..--A: —— L— J L,- –--1– 1 6 L, , L. –,., J, L, -i
behaviors and





that less educated respondents have the most difficulty with probabilistic
questions. We find that respondents with no more than a high school diploma are
only slightly more likely than others to report a 50 (e.g., thirteen percent
report a 50 for the burglary question).
a 50 for the burglary question, whereas nineteen percent of
50 for the health insurance question also do so for the
In personal communications, some researchers have asserted
3.4. The Sample Distribution of Risk Perceptions
We can summarize the central tendency of the responses reported in Table
2 by giving their sample means and medians. For health insurance, the sample
mean and median subjective probabilities are .15 and .02. For burglary, they are
.17 and .10. For job loss, they are .18 and .05. Observe that each sample mean
is much larger than the corresponding sample median. This reflects the skewness
of the sample distributions. Table 2 shows that, in each case, amajority of the
respondents place negligible or small subjective probability on
some respondents think the event moderately or even very likely
To more fully summarize the heterogeneity of risk percept




Sample Means and Quantiles of the Subjective Probabilities




le Mean Quantile Mean Quantile
& .25 .50 .75 .25 .50 .75
.20 .17 .02 .10 .20 .18 .00 .05 .20
Consider, for example, the perceived risk of job loss. At least twenty-five
percent of the respondents (the .25-quantile) see themselves as facing zero
chance of losing their jobs in the next year. At least fifty percent of the
respondents (the .50-quantile or median) see themselves as facing no more than
a .05 chance of job loss. But some do not feel so secure. The entry for the
.75-quantile shows that up to twenty-five percent of respondents see themselves
as facing a .20 chance or more of job loss in the next year. Other quantiles may
be derived directly from Table 2.
4. The Concentration of Insecurity
4.1. Measuring Insecurity
In Section 3 redescribed some basic features of the SEE sample data. From
here on, we use those data to draw conclusions about the risk perceptions of the
American population. To this end, we henceforth weight the sample datato adjust




the three events one at a time. Table 3 characterizes the
perceptions within various groups defined by gender, age,17
education, race, and employment status. Observe that,
subjective probability of each event is much higher
in every group, the mean
than the corresponding
median. Thus our earlier finding of skewness in the sample distribution of risk
perceptions persists when we examine the risk perceptions of subpopulations of
Americans.
Considering the three events one at a time does not reveal the extent to
which insecurity is concentrated within the population. Do most Americans
perceive a high risk of at least one adverse outcome, or rather do some perceive
high risks of all three events while others perceive themselves to be relatively
immune?
Let (p,, P2, P3) denote a person’s subjective probabilities of the three
events -- no health insurance, burglary, and job loss. The estimated
wide median values of the subjective probabilities of these




(.20, .20, .20). To measure the concentration of insecurity within various
groups, we report in Table 4 the fraction F(pl < .02, pz< .10, p~< .05) of group
members whose subjective probabilities all lie below the respective population
medians. We refer to these persons as relatively secure. We report the fraction
F(pl > .02, pz >.10, p > .05) of group members whose subjective probabilities
all exceed the population medians. We refer to these persons as relatively
insecure. We also compute the fraction F(pl > .20, Pz > .20, Pz > .20) of group
members whose subjective probabilities all exceed the population .75-quantiles.
We refer to these persons as highly insecure.
are
def
As reported in the top row of Table 4, we estimate that 16 percent of men
relatively secure and 14 percent are relatively insecure, according to these
nitions, leaving 70 percent in the intermediate group who are neither secure18
nor insecure. Highly insecure individuals constitute 4percent of the male labor
force. Similarly, among women, 16 percent are relatively secure, 13 percent are
relatively insecure, and 3 percent are highly insecure.
These results indicate that persons with a high subjective probability of
one event tend also to have high subjective probabilities of the other events.
If p,, pz, and p~ were statistically independent of one another, 10 (9) percent
of men (women) would be relatively secure, 6 (7) percent would be relatively
insecure, and 1 (1) percent would be highly insecure.4 Instead, we find these
percentages to be 16, 14, and 4 among men, and 16, 13, 3 among women. These
substantially larger values indicate that the subjective probabilities PI, P2,
and p~ are not statistically independent but rather are positively associated
within the labor force.
In Section 2, we identified weaknesses in previous attempts to measure
insecurity. We recognize that Table 4 also has its limitations. Perhaps most
significantly, we may have ignored important dimensions of insecurity. We do not
incorporate perceived risks to retirement savings or to home ownership, for
example. While wedo include the risk of job loss, wedo not include perceptions
of the loss of income associated with job loss. An advantage of our approach is
the natural way in which such additional dimensions may be included. If the
probabilities of other adverse outcomes are elicited, the classifications may be
redefined to incorporate the additional dimensions. In the meantime, we are
4Letj=l,2,3. If the empirical distribution of pj were continuous,
half of all respondents would have pj less than the empirical median and half
would have pj greater than the empirical median. A quarter would have pj greater
than the empirical .75-quantile. Hence, under the statistical independence
assumption, the fractions relatively secure and relatively insecure would each
be (.5)3 = .125, and the fraction highly insecure would be (.25)3 = .016.
Because the empirical distributions are discrete with some mass at their medians
and .75-quantiles, these fractions turn out to have the values .097, .066, .009
among men, and the values .092, .073, and .015 among women.19
satisfied that the three events we have selected capture an inherently
interesting array of risks.
4.2. Variation in Insecurity across Groups
How do risk perceptions vary across subgroups of the population? Tables
3 and 4 show that males and females have very similar overall distributions of
risk perceptions but somewhat different patterns by age and schooling. Among
females under age65, the fraction relatively secure increases substantially with
age from .13 (18-34 year-olds) to .27 (50-64 year-olds), while the fraction
relatively insecure decreases from .14 to .09. Table 3 reveals that the
subjective probabilities of each of the three events tend to decrease with age.
A weaker pattern emerges with respect to schooling. The fraction relatively
insecure decreases from .16 (high school diploma or less) to .10 (bachelor’s
degree or more), but the fraction relatively secure does not vary monotonically.
It is the subjective probability of no health insurance
clearly with schooling.
Among males, the variation with respect to age is s
among females, but the variation with schooling levels is
that decreases most
milar to that found
much more striking.
Whether the event be lack of health insurance or burglary, the subjective
probabilities of males with a bachelor’s degree tend to be less than half the
magnitudes of those with no more than a high school diploma. The job loss
probabilities also tend to be lower. Among males with a bachelor’s degree,
only .07 are relatively insecure and .02 are highly insecure. Among those with
no more than a high school diploma, .19 are relatively insecure and .07 are
highly insecure.20
Tables 3 and 4 show that whites and blacks have very different
distributions of risk perceptions, with blacks tending to report much greater
perceived insecurity than do whites. The racial pattern is apparent among both
males and females but is particularly strong among males. Whether the event be
lack of health insurance, burglary, or loss of
substantially higher subjective probabilities than do
black males are highly insecure. The fraction among
job, black males report
white males. Fully .180f
white males is just .02.
The tables also describe the risk perceptions of persons who currently are
both employed and covered by health insurance. This group, which constitutes an
estimated 79 percent of the labor force, may be thought of as the relatively
well-off core of the labor force in terms of current economic status. Being
well-off at a point in time does not, however, imply that one is secure. We see,
for example, that .13 of this group of males are relatively insecure, a fraction
which exceeds the .07 of males with a bachelor’s degree, regardless of employment
and insurance status. More generally, we see that the fraction relatively
insecure among employed, insured persons is one or two points lower than that of
the general labor force, whereas the fraction relatively secure is two or three
points higher.21
5, Trends in Risk Perce~tions
We undertook this studyto monitor economic insecurity. Thus far, we have
investigated the extent to which insecurity varies across and is concentrated
within segments of the labor force. We also aim to monitor variation in
insecurity over time. Our ability to track changes over time is limited because
the data collected to date span only two years.
pooled the four quarters of data--mid 1994, end
In previous sections, we have
1994, mid 1995, and end 1995.
In this section, we distinguish the time periods.
Table 5A describes the population distribution of the subjective
probabilities in each of the four quarters. Table 5B reports our measures of the
concentration of insecurity. Of the three events, perceptions of the risk of
burglary appear the most stable and the job loss probabilities are the most
volatile.
Some differences between the perceptions ofmal es and females are apparent.
Among males, the perceived risks of no health insurance and job loss tended to
decrease from mid 1994 to end 1994 before rising in mid 1995 and falling in end
1995, yielding concomitant fluctuations in the insecurity measures. Among
females (focusing on the population mean and .75-quantile), job loss
probabilities tended to increase from mid 1994 to end 1994 before falling in
successive quarters. Our measures of economic insecurity give no clear picture
of changes in insecurity among females across these time periods.
It isof interest to compare the trends in risk perceptions revealed by the
SEE instrument to the trends observed in other indicators of economic
expectations. One such measure is SRC’S Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE).
The ICE is constructed from responses to questions eliciting qualitative22
expectations of family financial well-being and business conditions, as well as
assessments of “buying conditions” (e.g., a “good time” or “bad time” to buy).
The ICE averaged 82.0 in mid 1994, 87.3 in end 1994, 83.9 in mid 1995, and80.7
in end 1995 (Survey Research Center, 1996). The Index of Consumer Sentiment,
which incorporates responses to two backward-looking questions on family
financial well-being and business conditions as well as the components of the
ICE, averaged 106.1 (mid 1994), 106.3 (end 1994), 105.4 (mid 1995), and 103,2
(end 1995). Each of these measures therefore exhibited a steady, if relatively
slight, decline from mid 1994 to end 1995.
6. The Ob.iective Accuracy of Elicited Risk Perceptions
In two distinct senses, we would like to determine the accuracy of the risk
perceptions that we elicit from respondents. First, we would like to know how
well the elicited subjective probabilities measure what persons really think
about their risks of health insurance coverage, burglary, and job loss in the
next year. Second, we would like to know how objectively accurate are the
reported risk perceptions.
We cannot offer any really satisfying way to assess accuracy in the first
sense. Every effort to interpret responses to subjective questions runs up
against the generic problem that a researcher cannot directly observe a
respondent’s thinking. We do judge the pattern of responses to be reasonable.
The findings presented in Section 3 indicate that respondents are willing to
answer the questions and do so in more than a perfunctory manner. The findings
in Section 4 make sense to us--the positive intra-person association among the23
subjective probabilities of the three events, the broad similarity of the risk
perceptions of males and females, the patterns of insecurity by age and
schooling, and the substantial difference in insecurity between whites and
blacks.
Perhaps the cleanest way to assess the objective accuracy of elicited
expectations is to re-interview respondents a year later, learn about their
experiences during the year, and compare the realized events with the
expectations elicited a year earlier. Such comparisons are straightforward if
one is willing to assume that realized events are statistically independent
across respondents. In this vein, Dominitz (1995) uses a one-year follow-up to
the 1993 version of SEE to assess the objective accuracy of respondents’ earnings
expectations.
Respondents to the 1994 and 1995 version of SEE have not been recontacted,
and so we cannot use this approach to assess the objective accuracy of their
elicited risk perceptions. We can, however, assess objective accuracy by
comparing the expectations elicited in 1994 to the realizations reported by
members of the same group in 1995.
All SEE respondents were asked these three questions:
Realized Health Insurance: Do you have any health insurance coverage?
Realized Burglary: During the past 12 months, did anyone break into or somehow
illegally get into your home and steal something?
Realized Job Loss: Have there been any times during the past 12 months when you
did not have a job and were looking for work?24
The first two questions elicit realizations of the same events about which the
expectations questions ask. The job loss question, which is one of the core
WISCON questions, does not correspond as well to the expectations question. 5
Suppose that the realizations of health insurance, burglary, and job loss
are statistically independent across respondents. Subject to this assumption,
we can assess the objective accuracy of elicited risk perceptions by comparing
population mean subjective probabilities reported in 1994 with corresponding
realized rates of occurrence reported in 1995. Table 6 presents this comparison
using data from the 1036 labor force participants in 1994 and the 1024 labor
force participants in 1995.
The findings are striking. The expectations and realizations of health
insurance and job loss match up closely. Among men (women), the mean subjective
probability of no health insurance is .15 (.16), and the subsequent proportion
without insurance in 1995 is .15 (.13). The mean job loss probability is .15
(.21) among men (women), and the subsequent rate of realization is .18 (.18).
The picture is quite different with respect to crime victimization.
Whereas only .03 of all women report in 1995 that they were victims in the past
year, the mean subjective probability of being burglarized (among 1994 women) was
.17. Discrepancies of this general magnitude showup across the board, in every
demographic and schooling group, among both males and females.
We can offer no compelling rationale for the large discrepancy between
5 The comparison is appropriate under the following two conditions: (i) all
unemployed job seekers over the past 12 months have lost a job rather than left
one voluntarily or recently entered the labor force and (ii) all job losers over
the past 12 months have spent some time as unemployed job seekers and did not
exit the labor force, Should condition (i) fail to hold, then we would overstate
the proportion of the labor force with realized job losses. Should condition
(ii) fail to hold, then we would understate the proportion with realized job
losses.25
expectations and realizations of burglary. Our findings do seem to corroborate
the conventional wisdom that Americans perceive crime to be far more prevalent
than it actually is (see Bursik and Grasmick, 1993, Chapter 4).
7. Conclusion
This study has presented ev dence on American perceptions of personal,
near-term economic insecurity during 1994 and 1995. Our method of monitoring
insecurity diverges substantially from standard survey methods, but it does have
elements in common with a series of recent studies in the U.S. and in Europe.
We find this approach to be promising, but we do not assert that we have
developed the best method possible. We believe that measures of insecurity
should be derived from reported subjective probabilities of a variety of well-
defined, adverse outcomes. The elicitation method, choice of outcomes, and
measure of insecurity are three subjects deserving further consideration.
We would also like to assess the effects of insecurity. Economic theory
suggests that income risk induces individuals to increase savings, thereby
decreasing consumption. Heightened fear of crime may cause individuals to take
precautions in their daily activities. Risks to health insurance coverage may
keep workers from switching jobs, yielding the phenomenon of “job lock.”
Economic insecurity may also adversely affect an individual ’s mental or physical
health (see Catalano, 1991). To make progress on these issues, we see the need
for simultaneous collection of data on actual behaviors thought to be related to
economic insecurity.26
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The WISCON sample includes all persons interviewed in the relevant time periods.
The SEE sample are those WISCONrespondents who are in the labor force and who
respond to the three expectations questions. The weighted fractions reflect
differential respondent-selection probabilities across households and time
periods.30
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standard errors in parentheses35
Table 5: Trends inRisk Perceptions
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Table 5: Trends in Risk Perceptions (continued)
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Standard errors in parentheses